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E7M7CEGC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 12 Cr. 876 (ALC) V. 5 PAUL CEGLIA, 6 Defendant. ----x 7 8 July 22, 2014 2:00 p.m. 9 10 Before: 11 HON. ANDREW L. CARTER, JR. District Judge 12 13 APPEARANCES 14 PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the 15 Southern District of New York BY: CHRISTOPHER FREY Assistant United States Attorney 16 17 DAVID PATTON ANNALISA MIRON 18 Attorneys for Defendant 19 GIBSON DUNN Attorneys for Facebook 20 BY: ALEXANDER SOUTHWELL MATTHEW BENJAMIN 21 22 23 24 25

1 (Case called)

2 (In open court)

MR. FREY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Christopher Frey for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. PATTON: Good afternoon, your Honor. David
Patton, and at counsel table is Annalisa Miron, for Mr. Ceglia,
who is joining us by telephone.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Good afternoon, Mr. Ceglia.

THE DEFENDANT: Good afternoon, your Honor.

MR. SOUTHWELL: Good afternoon, your Honor. Just to introduce myself, Alexander Southwell from Gibson Dunn on behalf of Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg. My colleague Matthew Benjamin is here as well.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

I have before me two issues I need to deal with today. First is the defense's request for a bill of particulars, and second is the defense request for certain information to be obtained through subpoena.

First, dealing with the bill of particulars, let me just get clarification here. It doesn't seem to me that there is a dispute, but maybe there is, regarding what or which contract is the real contract here, but maybe there is a dispute. Let me just get some information from the parties.

1 In the production, how many contracts have been produced that are dated April 28, 2003? I guess even before 2 3 getting there, the real contract is dated April 28, 2003, is 4 that correct? MR. FREY: That's the government's contention, yes, 5 6 your Honor. 7 THE COURT: OK. And it seemed to me that perhaps there were at least two contracts with that date. There was a 8 9 work for hire contract and a street -- street something 10 contract that were also dated that date. In the government's 11 response they pointed to some documents that were Bates stamped 12 39 and 40. Does that clear this issue up? Is that what the 13 government is claiming is the real contract here? 14 MR. FREY: Yes, your Honor, that's what the government 15 is claiming is the actual contract between Mark Zuckerberg and 16 Mr. Ceglia. 17 THE COURT: And that's the contract Bates stamped page 39 and 40? 18 19 MR. FREY: Yes, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Which contract is it? Is that the street? 21 MR. FREY: The street fax contract. 22 THE COURT: All right. The street fax. Does that 23 clarify it? Seems to me that clarifies that issue. 24 MR. PATTON: It does.

THE COURT: So that's been clarified, so the issue of

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bill of particulars of that is moot.

The second request seems to be likely moot. Now that the defense knows clearly which contract the government claims is the real contract, the defense can determine what has been allegedly forged or altered.

So, number one we have dealt with. Number two has been dealt with.

MR. PATTON: Your Honor, if I could. I think number two has been dealt with, but -- and the government can correct me if I'm wrong -- I think they have essentially responded as we expected, which is they're saying that page 2 of the contract that Mr. Ceglia is alleged to have sued upon was a copy of what the government alleges was the real contract, and it was page 1 that was doctored in some way and attached to it.

That doesn't necessarily follow from the government saying that what they've identified as what they claim to be the real contract is the real contract. I am sorry if this is sounding a bit twisted.

Number two is not resolved purely by the government's response to number one. I think they have responded in other places that do resolve it, and that they are essentially saying we're saying that Ceglia doctored page 1 and attached it to what we claim was the real page 2.

THE COURT: OK. Does the government have anything to add to this?

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I don't have anything to add, your Honor. MR. FREY: THE COURT: OK. So number two has been dealt with, it's moot.

Number three: Identify the e-mails involving Ceglia and/or Zuckerberg that the government claims are inauthentic. I am going to deny that request.

Number four: Whereas the government states in the indictment that Ceglia also destroyed evidence that was inconsistent with his theory in the civil suit, identify the evidence the government alleges that Ceglia destroyed.

I am inclined to deny that request as well, but let me just got a sense, is the government in a position to do that? Does the government have that information currently?

MR. FREY: To the extent we have it, your Honor, it's been provided to the defense. It consists largely of our forensic expert and the report that was generated and produced to defense counsel with respect to alterations or deletions of material.

THE COURT: Defense counsel?

MR. PATTON: And that's fine. If the government's response is: What we know of at this point is what is contained in the government's computer forensic expert report -- which is the Curtis Rose report -- then that's fine and that answers it. But I do think we would be entitled to know if at this point they are alleging that some other

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evidence was destroyed. We would need to have that information to be able to prepare any sort of defense of evidence being destroyed.

THE COURT: OK. It seems that the government has answered that question to the best of its ability now. I think it would be inappropriate for me to ask the government to become Miss Cleo or some other psychic and try to determine what other evidence might have been --

In terms of the evidence they have identified thus far, they have given that information. There may be other evidence that is in their possession that they have yet to cull through and go through and make determinations. I am not prepared to force the government to do that now. Obviously, the government will need to turn this information over on an ongoing basis to the extent they continue to get more information regarding the materials that they feel have been altered.

MR. PATTON: And, your Honor, to be clear, we're not asking for them to look into the future, but I do think we are entitled to if they have some other allegation of destruction of evidence that they know now that they are going to be relying on — not that it might be contained in the voluminous amounts of materials that exist — but just that when they make that allegation in the indictment, what are they referring to? At this point if it's contained in the expert report, then so

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be it, fine. But if they are referring to something that we haven't been told about, that they know about right now, I think we ought to be able to investigate that.

THE COURT: Does the government have anything to say? MR. FREY: Your Honor, all I can say is to the extent we know about it, we have provided the underlying materials to defense counsel. Again, it consists largely of the forensic expert's analysis.

MR. PATTON: I'm worried about that qualifier.

MR. FREY: I don't mean anything by the qualifier. I stand here today it consists of the forensic analysis.

THE COURT: All right. So, I will deny that request.

Number five: Whom does the government claim Ceglia intended to deceive as part of the fraudulent scheme alleged?

I think that the government has made that clear in the indictment, so I'm going to deny that request.

Number six: To the extent that the government is relying on the theory that corrupting the judicial process constitutes fraud, what communications to the court were fraudulent?

I will deny that request.

Number seven: If the government intends to rely on settlement discussions to prove the alleged fraudulent scheme, identify the instances in which Ceglia engaged or attempted to engage in settlement discussions.

I am taking this request to mean that the defense is asking for dates of settlement discussions? Is that what you are talking about, dates and potential locations of settlement discussions?

MR. PATTON: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. I feel that that is appropriate, and I am inclined to grant that request. Anything from the government on that?

MR. FREY: I would just say, your Honor, I think

Mr. Ceglia is probably in the better position of the parties in
this matter to know the answer to that question. I understand
that your Honor is inclined to grant it, and that's fine. I
don't know that there will be anything for the government to
produce in response to that.

THE COURT: OK. Well, I guess the first question might be then, since this request is stated in the conditional, at this point does the government intend to rely on settlement discussions?

MR. FREY: The government does not currently intend to rely on settlement discussions.

THE COURT: OK. So it seems to me at this point that this is perhaps moot now. What's defense counsel's position on that?

MR. PATTON: That's fine, your Honor. Obviously if the government changes its mind, we would like to know about

it.

THE COURT: OK. So I will deny that.

Regarding the documents produced on December 24, 2012, identify the source of the documents produced, the location from which they were retrieved, and the manner in which the documents were obtained via search warrant, subpoena or some other manner.

Just let me get a little bit more elucidation from the defense as to why you need this information.

MR. PATTON: Your Honor, largely to -- and to be clear, I think for much of it at this point we now do have that information.

But that information may either have direct relevance to guilt or innocence in terms of the government's proof in the case, that is, where some document was found might be relevant to the case. Secondly, it might be relevant to opposing some sort of Fourth Amendment challenge.

THE COURT: OK. And I think in your submission you mentioned something else about some other sort of forensic computer analysis of this information. Is this relevant to that as well, or no?

MR. PATTON: I'm not sure I'm following the question.

THE COURT: OK. I thought that there was also a request -- obviously if some of these documents -- again, I'm not sure what was in the December 24, 2012 regarding your

earlier request — that if some of these documents were retrieved via computer or something of the like, or that sort of information, that the defense indicated that it might intend to have someone conduct some sort of forensic analysis related to that recovery of that material.

MR. PATTON: Correct, your Honor, and that certainly also relates to some of the subpoena issues.

THE COURT: OK. So I'm inclined to grant that request. Anything from the government on that?

MR. FREY: Your Honor, I will just note that the government believes it has adequately described to defense counsel where various materials were obtained from in our cover letter with the production of discovery in December of 2012. We set forth where documents had been obtained by. There was one search warrant in this case. A copy had been provided to defense counsel.

You know, in the reply briefing on the bill of particulars motion, defense counsel takes issue with certain documents, and that consists largely of background materials concerning Facebook, which just on their face it's clear they are public source documents, a chapter from a book, a newspaper article. There is nothing hidden with respect to where those materials came from. The government believes that defense counsel knows quite well where everything that has been produced came from, and they are in a position to determine

whether there are motions to be made or otherwise.

MR. PATTON: So, your Honor, if I could use that just as an example, because this is one of the items.

THE COURT: OK. I guess before you address this, as I indicated, I'm inclined to grant this request to the extent this material has not already been turned over, but I will give you an opportunity --

MR. PATTON: Then I will quit while I'm ahead.

THE COURT: So I will grant request number eight to the extent that material has not been turned over, regarding the location and the sources of these documents.

All right. So that deals with everything. I think that resolves everything with the bill of particulars. Now let's move on to the issue of the subpoenas. I know the parties have requested oral argument regarding this. I will give the parties a brief opportunity to address the court in that regard.

OK. Since this is the defense subpoena, I will start with defense counsel and give you a few minutes to go ahead and address me.

MR. PATTON: Thank you, your Honor. I won't go into great detail; I'll save things for whatever questions the court may have. But as a general proposition, if these subpoenas were denied certainly in whole but at least in part, we would have a trial where at root the case is about whether or not two

people signed a particular contract, what contract did they sign.

The government has produced and has access to almost all -- I'm not aware of what they don't have access to -- of one of those party's computers, bank records, internet searches, vast quantities of information, based on all sorts of electronic media that they've gathered. On the flip side, we have nothing.

It strikes me as just fundamentally unfair that we would go to trial, where the issue is what happened between these two people, and we have this mountain of electronic evidence on one side and nothing on the other.

At the very least we should have access to those things that have already been gathered. It would not be burdensome. We are not asking necessarily at least at the outset to do a remarkable amount of digging.

We already know that a large quantity of

Mr. Zuckerberg's electronic media has been gathered and has

been stored and exists because of prior litigation. So, we are

not asking them to do some extraordinary search or hunt for

that material at least. Obviously, we may be unaware of

additional material that exists from '03, '04. But at the very

least we can start with that material.

And, similarly, we could start with finding out how Harvard backs up its servers. We have already demonstrated

that which backup day you collect from can affect the material that's on there; not all backup dates necessarily contain everything prior to that date. And we don't know how Harvard backs up its servers. We don't know whether they do it on a daily basis, on a weekly basis, on a monthly basis. We would like to have that information, and we would like to, using that information, get a much better, more accurate, snapshot or collection of Mr. Zuckerberg's e-mails.

It's fairly remarkable that the backup that was selected by both Facebook and the government to retrieve from Harvard is from late November, when the e-mails that the government is claiming are inauthentic actually largely post-date that date. And there are other circumstances that exist. There are other communications that exist post that backup date that would be remarkably relevant to the matters at hand here. So, at the very least we should be looking at those materials.

As for other materials related to bank records and telephone records, I admit that we're not on as strong a footing for getting those materials, but they are relevant.

The government and Facebook have repeatedly claimed that, look, you know these e-mails are wrong or unauthentic, or you know this is the correct version of the contract because it either comports or doesn't comport with some objective fact that we know about, that can either be verified through

canceled checks or bank records.

We don't have the same ability to examine those records to see whether or not they comport with the e-mails that are widely accepted to be true versus the ones that are contested. That information is highly relevant to us just in the same way that it's highly relevant to the government and Facebook and the way they are planning to use it at trial.

THE COURT: OK. Let me hear from the government, and I will give counsel for Facebook an opportunity to address me.

Let me just let the parties know that in terms of the legal standard here that I am applying the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Nixon, not the Tucker standard that was articulated by Judge Scheindlin.

It should be noted that Judge Scheindlin in articulating that Tucker test cabined that test to apply only where the production is requested on the eve of trial and the defendant has an articulable suspicion that the documents may be material to the defense.

So, I'm going to go under the Supreme Court standard articulated in Nixon that the 17(c) subpoena must demonstrate the relevancy, admissibility and specificity of its request.

I guess I should have indicated that before I gave defense counsel an opportunity to make his presentation. I will give defense counsel an opportunity to supplement it now if there is anything you would like to add in regards to that.

MR. PATTON: Your Honor, particularly with respect to the eve of trial issue, this is material that would have to be examined by experts for it to be meaningful. So to seek this material on the eve of trial frankly either does us no good or it results in a last minute adjournment of proceedings.

Nothing is going to change between now and the eve of trial in terms of our knowledge about whether or not this material is relevant. So, I do think that we are in a fundamentally position than BOP phone calls.

Frankly, I think we are in a stronger position than Tucker, because there is an argument to be made, and arguments have been made about whether that subpoenaing material from the government, as opposed to a situation here where we are subpoenaing material that is clearly from a nongovernment actor, not remotely related to law enforcement or the government. And I do think Judge Scheindlin's reasoning as well as several other courts that we cited in our papers makes a lot of sense.

Nixon is an entirely different circumstance; it's the government seeking material; it's the government seeking it from the President of the United States. There are sound reasons why when the defense is seeking to gather information not from the government — which I mean the government briefs almost respond as though we have subpoenaed the government for this material. There is no reason that Rule 17 — which was

based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which do not contain restricting language that is discussed in Nixon — there is no reason to limit what the defense should be able to gather that is clearly material to the defense, and it would not be onerous on the party that we are seeking material from.

THE COURT: OK, thank you. Let me hear from the government.

MR. FREY: Your Honor, obviously the government agrees with the court that the Nixon standard is the appropriate standard to be applied here.

First, with respect to the point that defense counsel makes about the unfairness of it all, I think Judge Scheindlin said it best in Tucker that a criminal prosecution is in no sense a symmetrical proceeding, that for better or worse due process demand only that a criminal defendant receive a constitutionally adequate defense and that the parties in a criminal prosecution be equally matched.

The fact of the matter is that the subpoenas here largely are overbroad, they are burdensome, and the government has real concerns with respect to the requests that have the potential to unduly or inappropriately harass not a prospective witness but a witness that the government 100 percent knows will be calling to testify at this trial, and that is with respect to Mark Zuckerberg.

With respect to -- and I will start first with the

Harvard subpoens -- with respect to the e-mails, first of all, the government has no objection to a subpoena to Harvard that requests the protocols for backup. We noted that in our opposition, and that strikes the government as perfectly fine. It's not something that's currently in the government's possession, and that's why it wasn't produced to defense counsel in discovery. But that seems appropriate.

I take issue, however, with defense counsel's assertion that the government selected dates by which it received e-mails from Harvard. Those were the dates that the captures were done by Harvard at various points in time based on various events in history, based on their retention policy, based on litigation requests in other matters, and that is, as the government understands it, what Harvard has in its possession, or it had at the time that the government made its request to Harvard University.

Now, of the three dates that the government received captures from Harvard, the government reviewed that material and produced what it believed it was obligated to produce pursuant to Rule 16. There is a larger set of material that is still relevant to this case and that the government intends to produce closer in time to trial, because it contains either 3500 material for Mr. Zuckerberg, or potential Giglio/Jencks cross-examination material, but that's not appropriate at this point.

And the request as drafted is really nothing more than a fishing expedition that is likely to reveal material that could be potentially embarrassing to Mr. Zuckerberg or to others, quite frankly, who are involved in those e-mail communications.

So at this point the government sees no reason why defense counsel or the defendant would be entitled to a full set of Mr. Zuckerberg's e-mails from any account that he used during the relevant time period. We believe that the defense has everything that it needs at this stage and will be receiving more, consistent with our obligations as we move forward.

With respect to the request for disciplinary records, again that strikes the government as nothing more than a fishing expedition for potential Giglio and cross-examination material, nothing that at this point in time can be articulated as relevant.

Now, with respect to Mr. Zuckerberg himself and to Facebook — counsel for those parties are here today and I am sure will address this further — but obviously the government has concern with the potential for undue harassment of Mr. Zuckerberg as a potential witness in this trial. The requests for all computer, cell phones, electronic media, again without further specificity or limitation as to relevance, in the government's view it does not meet the standard articulated

in Nixon, and it would be nothing more than a fishing expedition. The same is true for the bank records that have been requested as well.

Unless the court has any further questions, the government will rest on its written submission in this regard.

THE COURT: OK, thank you. Let me hear from counsel for Facebook.

MR. SOUTHWELL: Thank you, your Honor.

Largely for the reasons that we laid out in our papers, we would ask the court to reject the sweepingly overbroad and unreasonable subpoenas that are sought against our client Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook. They lack specificity, they lack relevance, and they lack admissibility under Nixon or frankly even under the lower standard, and they really only serve to further harass our clients who are the victims here and are entitled to respect under the relevant statutory authorities here.

Quite clearly to seek every computer, cell phone, electronic source device that Mr. Zuckerberg or every employee of Facebook used during 2003 and 2004 is really by definition a fishing expedition.

There is certainly a corpus of material that we think would meet that standard, and that which we have offered to voluntary produce without the need for a subpoena, and we have laid that out at pages 6 and 7 of our letter of June 30, 2014.

And I think that would be an appropriate basis that we would offer voluntarily that really covers everything.

Just to be clear about that, your Honor, to echo what AUSA Frey said, in the context of the civil case, and pursuant to our discovery obligations there, we forensically preserved any data that Harvard held related to Mr. Zuckerberg's e-mail accounts. So whatever data Harvard had, we have a forensic copy of it. And that was the subject of deposition questioning by civil counsel for Mr. Ceglia.

So the record has been established that whatever Harvard has has been preserved. Moreover, whatever that preserved body of electronic evidence is has been searched for any correspondence between Ceglia or anybody that was known to be working with him and Zuckerberg, and that has been produced in the civil case. So, all of that has been developed, quite frankly, in the civil case, and we are prepared to produce it.

I don't know actually what the government has turned over, but we are prepared to turn over the correspondence between our client and Mr. Ceglia and the others, as we laid out in the letter, and we think that is an appropriate resolution.

I think that it is notable that Mr. Patton says he would like to look at these materials, and he doesn't specify these materials. He is asking for the entire computer, the entire contents of the e-mail accounts, including all manner of

rank, inadmissible, irrelevant material. That's not proper, because he is not entitled to look at those materials under Rule 17(c)(3).

But we are willing to offer the materials that we think are relevant and admissible as we have laid out. We think that is the appropriate response, and we would ask your Honor reject the requests for the subpoenas and allow us to voluntarily produce the materials spelled out.

THE COURT: OK, thank you.

MR. PATTON: Your Honor, may I be heard?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PATTON: Particularly with respect to Harvard, we didn't get into the objecting — this afternoon we haven't gotten into objecting to the government's standing to raise these issues. We continue to take that position, as we set it forth in our papers.

But particularly with respect to Harvard it's relevant here because a subpoena hasn't even been issued; Harvard hasn't been heard on this. And I think it's just black and white that the government does not have standing to object at this point to Harvard producing this material.

If this is truly the entirety of what Harvard has, I mean it just strikes me as remarkable -- and maybe I'm wrong about this -- but it strikes me as remarkable that there is a backup date in November 2003 and not one again until 2010.

I think we ought to hear from Harvard about their backup policies. Maybe, frankly, once that material is produced about what their policies are and how often they back up, we will have a better sense of what is at issue here. But I don't think the government is in a position to object to this on behalf of Harvard.

THE COURT: OK, thank you.

MR. SOUTHWELL: Your Honor, could I just very briefly respond to that point? Just to make the record clear, there was a civil deposition which spelled out -- and there are civil declarations filed in this case -- that spell out the dates of the backups that Harvard represented they possess that has any data related to Mark Zuckerberg.

It's hardly a surprise that an educational institution does not keep backups in the way that a Fortune 100 company does. They have represented that these are the only backups. That is in sworn declarations in the civil case. It was the subject of cross-examination during deposition. So the record is clear in that regard.

But certainly we also have no objection to Harvard producing policies related to that. We do believe we have standing, and I would submit that the government has standing as it relates to an effort to harass our client who is entitled to standing as the crime victim here and as a main government witness in the case.

THE COURT: Thank you. I find that the government does have standing to object to these subpoenas. Let's go one by one.

Let's talk about Harvard University. The first request, the first subpoena is the contents of any and all e-mail communications for the years 2003 and 2004 for accounts registered to Mark Elliot Zuckerberg, including but not limited to the account mzuckerb@fas.harvard.edu. I am denying that request as too broad.

Go to the number three request under the Harvard
University subpoena, because it relates directly to number one:
Any and all backup copies of the e-mail communications
requested in item one above, whether maintained on-site or
off-site. I will also deny that as too broad.

Then number two: Any and all documents setting forth Harvard University's policies and protocols relating to backing up, storing and maintaining the contents of e-mail communications for Harvard email addresses from 2003 to the present. I will grant that and allow that subpoena to go forward.

Number four: Any and all documents relating to disciplinary proceedings relating to Mark Zuckerberg's unauthorized access to Harvard's computer systems, or Mark Zuckerberg's violation of any Harvard policies or rules relating to computer usage and/or student privacy. I will deny

that request. That very well may be appropriate later, but I am denying that request.

I believe that covers the requests for Harvard, but defense counsel can correct me if I'm wrong. Is there another subpoena request regarding Harvard?

MR. PATTON: Your Honor, I believe that covers it. I guess I would just ask that once we do have the policies and procedures about backup, I assume the court's order does not preclude some further request based on what we learn from that information.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. PATTON: And perhaps a narrowing of what we have requested here.

THE COURT: That's correct.

OK. Regarding Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg, request number one: Any and all agreements, draft agreements, or copies thereof, in any format or media, including electronic or paper, between Facebook/Mark Zuckerberg and Paul Ceglia, or between companies managed or owned in whole or in part by either Facebook/Zuckerberg or Ceglia.

This appears to be appropriate to me, and from what I've heard from the parties it seems to indicate I think that Facebook claims that Ceglia already has these documents. I think that's basically where we are. Is that correct?

MR. SOUTHWELL: Well, your Honor, I don't know what

Mr. Patton on behalf of Mr. Ceglia in the criminal case has. I do know that in the civil case what existed with respect to written agreements has been produced, and the written agreement is the street fax contract, which says nothing about Facebook. That was recovered off of Mr. Ceglia's computer, and that is what was produced.

I guess I would just ask your Honor -- because I think that the language that is included in these subpoenas is in and of itself overbroad -- I would ask your Honor to deny the subpoenas, allow us to voluntarily produce the material that we spelled out.

I am happy to work with Mr. Patton and explain to him what we are providing to him, what exists, what doesn't exist. I am just troubled by the scope of some of the language in the subpoena, and I think that it would be much more efficient for us to simply turn over what we've -- and I am happy to explain it to Mr. Patton, and it may be that it's new material to them. I don't know. And that would be a more effective way to proceed, rather than have to go through specific language which, you know, there may be problematic aspects.

THE COURT: Mr. Patton, anything on that?

MR. PATTON: Your Honor, obviously we are happy to receive the material that Facebook offered to produce in its response. When they provided that response, they dropped footnotes that essentially said but Ceglia already has all of

this material.

So, I mean I'm happy to see what documents are contained in that production and to have further discussions and perhaps narrow our requests based on what is produced to us. I am happy to do that.

It sounds like that would certainly not cover, for instance, material that's on the 28 devices that were examined and that are held by either Facebook or a third party that were examined by Facebook's expert in a civil matter, which, you know, I think that that material would contain highly relevant information for this case that we're still going to be seeking from Facebook, from Mark Zuckerberg.

So I am happy to sort of see what we get and see if that resolves this, and approach the court after we have done that.

THE COURT: OK, let's do this then: Let's have

Facebook voluntarily turn over the information that it

indicated that it was willing to turn over. I will deny that

subpoena request number one without prejudice, and see where we

are once the defense has that information.

Number two: Any and all written correspondence or communication, or copies thereof, in any format or media, including electronic or paper, between Facebook/Zuckerberg and Ceglia, or between companies managed or owned in whole or in part by either Facebook/Zuckerberg or Ceglia.

It seems to me we should probably do the same thing regard request two that we did for number one, but let me hear from the parties if they have a different view of things.

MR. SOUTHWELL: Yes, agreed. I am happy again to work with Mr. Patton and explain. He mentioned these 28 other assets. Those were in fact searched, and there is nothing on those materials, and that was made clear in the civil case.

To be clear, our view is that Mr. Ceglia is aware of this. I don't know whether Mr. Patton is aware of it, and so I am happy to work with Mr. Patton to make sure he is aware, and hopefully there won't be any issues, and if there are, we know where to find the judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Patton?

MR. PATTON: Your Honor, I know -- and I certainly don't know the civil case as well as Mr. Southwell -- I know from some of the civil materials that at least that was the statement made in the deposition by Mr. McGowan, that he had examined those. But it's not clear to me what -- I know they used search terms, but it's not entirely clear to me what search terms were used. I know that at one point in the deposition there was a claim that some of the material that we are talking about now, communications between Ceglia and Zuckerberg and other people associated with the companies, was outside the purview of what they were looking for.

So I don't know if they have done additional searches;

I don't know what those terms have been. Again, I am happy to have further discussions with them to fill in some of that information and then take it from there.

THE COURT: OK, that's fine. So we will do the same thing: Number two is denied without prejudice, and Facebook will voluntarily turn over the information that they indicated in their submission, and counsel for Mr. Ceglia and counsel for Facebook should get together and try to work things out.

Let's move to number five under that: Forensically sound copies of any and all contents of e-mail accounts registered to or regularly used by Facebook/Zuckerberg during the years 2003 and 2004.

I am going to deny that; that's too broad.

Number three: Forensically sound copies of the content of any and all computers, electronic storage devices, and other electronic media devices owned or regularly used by Facebook/Zuckerberg during the years 2003 and 2004.

Number four: Forensically sound copies of the contents of any and all cell phones owned or regularly used by Facebook/Zuckerberg during the years 2003 and 2004.

I am going to deny that as well. That is also too broad.

I think that resolves everything dealing with the subpoenas. Have I left anything out, defense counsel?

MR. PATTON: I don't believe your Honor addressed the

bank account.

THE COURT: OK. And the request for the bank account is also denied as too broad. Is there anything else, defense counsel, regarding the subpoenas?

MR. PATTON: Not at this time, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. It seems to me that at this point where we are is the parties are still engaged in going through — the defense is still engaged in going through the large volume of electronic materials in this case and going through review of these materials with their client.

So it seems to me that perhaps what we should do is adjourn this matter and have another status date in about 45 days or so and see where we are with the discovery that's been produced, and see if there are anymore issues regarding any requests by the defense. I will hear from the parties. Any different take on things?

MR. PATTON: I think that's exactly what we were discussing before your Honor came out, so I think that makes sense.

THE COURT: Are counsel around the first week of September?

MR. PATTON: Yes, your Honor.

MR. FREY: Yes, your Honor.

DEPUTY COURT CLERK: Friday, September the 5th at

25 | 12:30?

1 MR. PATTON: That's fine with us. THE COURT: Does that work for everyone? 2 3 MR. FREY: Yes, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Now, it seems to me that counsel for --5 well, what are the parties' position? It seems to me it's not 6 necessarily necessary to have counsel for Facebook here, at 7 least to order that at this time. If in the interim between now and September 5 it's determined that that will be 8 9 appropriate, I guess counsel can send me a letter and file that 10 letter electronically. But do counsel have any position on that? 11 12 MR. PATTON: No, your Honor. 13 MR. FREY: No, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: OK. 15 MR. SOUTHWELL: Your Honor, one last thing, if I could just request that pursuant to the CVRA 18 U.S.C. 3771 that we 16 17 be given notice of any subpoenas or applications that relate to our clients' rights. So, for example, Harvard, if that issue 18 is raised again, I think we have a right under 3771 to be heard 19 20 on those issues, so I would simply request to be notified so

THE COURT: Does anyone have any position on that?

MR. PATTON: No, your Honor. I will just say that in terms of how we went about it in this setting, had the court signed those subpoenas, they would have been served, Facebook

that we can appear if necessary.

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could have moved to quash, so there wouldn't be any sort of surreptitious subpoenaing. But, of course, I'm happy to keep everybody in the loop.

THE COURT: OK, so we will do that.

In the past I have certainly excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act. I think it's appropriate to continue to do that. We have a trial date in this case, I believe it's November the 17th. Is that right?

MR. FREY: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: It seems to me that it's appropriate to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act from today's date until November 17 because the defense will need that time to continue to prepare for trial. This is a complex case due to the volume and the nature of the electronic discovery in this case.

I find it's in the interests of Mr. Ceglia and in the interests of justice to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act from today's date until November 17.

I further find that Mr. Ceglia's interest and the interests of justice outweigh the public's interest in a speedy trial, and I will enter an order to that effect.

So, again, we have excluded time from today's date until November 17 under the Speedy Trial Act, and we will adjourn this matter until September 5 at 12:30.

Anything else from the government today?

MR. FREY: No, your Honor. Thank you.

E7M7CEGC THE COURT: Anything else from the defense? MR. PATTON: No, your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Anything else from Facebook? MR. SOUTHWELL: No, thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Ceglia, did you hear everything that happened here? THE DEFENDANT: I did, your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: OK, have a good day. (Adjourned to September 5, 2014 at 12:30 p.m.)